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Section 104(a)(2) Unsupported by

Tax Theory

Should Personal Injury
Damage Awards Be Taxed?
MARK W. COCHRAN
Case Western Reserve Law Review

Introduction
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code excludes from gross income "the
amount of any damages received . . . on
account of personal injury or sickness."
Originally enacted in 1918, the provision is
almost as old as the modem federal income
tax system. According to the committee report on the original legislation, the exclusion was enacted because it was "doubtful," under existing law, whether such damages were required to be included in gross
income. In other words, the Committee perceived the statutory exclusion as a mere
clarification of existing law.
Courts have broadened the concept of
gross income significantly since 1918, but
the statutory exclusion for personal injury
damage awards has survived. Absent the exclusion, most damage awards would constitute gross income under the modem defmition. Thus, the original exclusion was based
upon what now appears to be an erroneous
assumption. To the extent that the original
reasoning no longer supports the exclusion,
a search for alternative reasons is appropriate. One might first ask whether there is arty

basis in "tax theory" for excluding personal
injury damage awards from gross income. If
no such basis can be found, the inescapable
conclusion is that the exclusion is a tax subsidy- a benefit supported, if at all, by policy considerations. To the extent Sec.
104(a)(2) represents a tax subsidy, an inquiry into the reasons for and consequences of
the subsidy is appropriate.

Tax Theory
Gross income, according to Sec. 61, includes "all income from whatever source
derived" unless another provision specifically excludes the item in question. Section
104(a)(2) is, of course, such a specific exclusion. While the existence of Sec.
104(a)(2) traditionally has been justified as
a humanitarian gesture, more logical explanations occasionally have been offered. As illustrated below, the proffered explanations
either rest on erroneous assumptions or do
not justify a blanket exclusion.
Return of Capital
The most familiar justification for the exclusion from gross income of personal in-
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jury damage awards is that the recipient is
merely being "made whole" by the award
(see Hawkins v. Comm'r, 6 BTA 1023). In
tax parlance, being "made whole" is viewed as a return of capital. For example, a taxpayer buys a share of stock for $100 and
later sells the same share for $100, the taxpayer has no gross income because she is
only recovering her original investment. Recovery of one's original investment is what
is meant by "return of capital."
The return of capital analysis is appealing, especially in the case of damages
awarded for loss of a limb or organ. This
type of injury graphically illustrates the concept of "human capital" (see Solie. Mem.
1384, 1920-2 CB 71, for an articulation of
the "human capital" concept). The problem
with this analogy is that a return of capital is
excluded from gross income only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the capital. A
taxpayer's basis in property is generally the
amount paid for the property (Sec. 1012).
Any receipt in excess of the taxpayer 's basis
constitutes a taxable gain (Sec. 1001(a)).
Thus, in the example above, if the taxpayer
pays $100 for stock and sells it for $150, the
taxpayer realizes a $50 taxable gain. However, in the personal injury context, a taxpayer 's basis is zero because a taxpayer
generally does not pay for his limbs or organs. The recipient of a personal injury
damage award is being "made whole" in
the same sense that the taxpayer selling her
stock for $150 is being made whole- by
receiving the full value of what is being given up. Like the taxpayer selling her stock,
the personal injury plaintiff should be allowed to exclude only that portion of the
award that represents recovery of an actual
investment of capital. If the taxpayer's basis
in the "capital" cannot be established, no
part of the award can accurately be called a
return of capital. Actually, it is unnecessary
to speculate about whether a taxpayer has a
basis in the various parts of his body. A per-
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sonal injury award does not pay a taxpayer
for the damage to his or her body per se;
rather, the taxpayer is compensated for consequent economic loss (i.e., lost earnings)
and, in some instances, pain and suffering.
Such compensation clearly falls outside the
scope of the return of capital concept, since
no capital is being exchanged for the award.
Involuntary Transaction
Even if the plaintiff's recovery cannot accurately be characterized as a return of capital, one might be tempted to conclude that
the damage award should not be taxed because of the involuntary nature of the transaction. After all, the plaintiff did not choose
to be injured. The existence of other Code
provisions that grant special status to "involuntary gains" might be cited in support
of this conclusion. Specifically, Sec. 1033
allows a taxpayer to postpone recognition of
a gain resulting from an involuntary conversion of property in certain circumstances.
Normally, if the taxpayer's property is destroyed and the taxpayer is compensated for
the destroyed property (by insurance or otherwise), the taxpayer will recognize a gain
to the extent the compensation exceeds the
basis of the property. If the taxpayer invests
the compensation in replacement property,
however, Sec. 1033 allows recognition of
the gain to be postponed until the taxpayer
disposes of the replacement property (Sec.
1033(b)).
Section 104(a)(2) might appear to be
analogous to Sec. 1033, but there are two
important differences. First, Sec. 1033 does
not render the gain from an involuntary conversion non-taxable. Rather, it merely allows recognition of the gain to be postponed. Second, in order to qualify for deferral under Sec. 1033, the taxpayer must invest the compensation for the destroyed
property in replacement property. By contrast, Sec. 104(a)(2) provides an absolute
exclusion rather than a mere deferral. More-
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over, the exclusion is not dependent on the
taxpayer's use of the award; she may spend
the money any way she likes. If would seem
that the personal injury plaintiff is more like
the employee who is wrongfully discharged.
The employee did not ask to be fired, and
his firing may have been a breach of the
contract under which he was employed, but
the employee is free to spend his damage
recovery however he sees fit and, thus, must
include it in gross income (see Hodge v.
Comm'r, 64 TC 616, but see Metzger v.
Comm' r, 88 TC 3000).

Imputed Income
The Internal Revenue Service and the
courts have been reluctant to extend the
concept of gross income to include so-called
"imputed income." The generally accepted
definition of imputed income is the "flow of
satisfactions from durable goods owned and
used by the taxpayer, or from goods and
services arising out of the personal exertions
of the taxpayer on his own behalf. " For example, if the taxpayer, a mechanic, repairs
his own car, he is enjoying the fruits of his
labor. In an economic sense, the taxpayer
has realized an accession to wealth. While
such income arguably could be taxed, as a
general rule it is not.
Damage awards sometimes represent
compensation for the loss of what would
have been imputed income. For example, if
a husband is disabled as a result of an accident and his wife is awarded damages for
the loss of the husband's household services, the damage award is a cash substitute
for imputed income that would have been
enjoyed tax free. Thus, it could be argued,
logic requires that the damage award also be
enjoyed tax free. While this is indeed the
treatment under Sec. 104(a)(2), it is far from
clear that logic requires such a result. It is
generally agreed that imputed income escapes taxation for practical rather than logical reasons. Specifically, difficulty in defm-

ing and valuing imputed income are the
main obstacles to its taxation. It appears that
these obstacles are removed when imputed
income is reduced to cash. Thus, while damage awards sometimes represent a substitute
for non-taxable imputed income, it does not
follow that such awards should be excluded
from gross income on that basis.

Administrative Considerations
In addition to the theoretical justifications
discussed above, certain administrative considerations are served by the exclusion of
damage awards from gross income. These
considerations are discussed below.
Bunching of Income.- A damage award
often results in the plaintiff receiving a
lump-sum income that otherwise would
have been received over a number of years.
This is especially true of awards compensating the plaintiff for loss of earning capacity.
It might be asserted that it is unfair to subject such an award to the progressive rate
structure of the federal income tax, since the
bunching usually forces the recipient into a
higher marginal rate bracket. This problem
is avoided, of course, if the award is not taxed at all. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 lowered the maximum marginal income tax rate
for individuals from 50% to 33% and reduced the number of rate brackets from 13
to three. These changes greatly reduce the
perceived unfairness associated with bunching of income. To the extent that such unfairness continues to exist, some type of rate
relief through averaging seems a more appropriate remedy than wholesale exclusion
from gross income.
Medical Expenses.- It may be argued
that, if damage awards were taxed, plaintiffs
incurring large amounts of medical expenses would be saddled with tax liability in
excess of their ability to pay. Assume, for
example, that plaintiff is injured and incurs
$20,000 in medical expenses. If plaintiff's
$20,000 recovery is taxed, he or she will not
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have enough to pay both the tax liability and
the medical bills. The deduction for medical
expenses provided by Sec. 213 is of no help
here, because medical expenses are not deductible if they are "compensated for by insurance or otherwise." Apparently, the tax
character of the reimbursement is irrelevant
(see Litchfield v. Comm'r, 40 TC 967, aff'd,
330 F.2d 509). Thus, even if the damage
award were taxed, Sec. 213 would not allow
a deduction for the medical expenses.
Obviously, the medical expense problem
is avoided by excluding the recovery from
gross income. If the recovery were taxed,
however, the problem also could be avoided
by amending Sec. 213 to provide that a taxable reimbursement of medical expenses
will not preclude a deduction of those expenses.
Since the deduction for medical expenses
cannot exceed adjusted gross income for the
year in which the expenses are paid, a timing problem could result if the expenses
were paid in a year other than the year in
which the recovery is received (and, under
our supposition, taxed) . For example, if
plaintiff recovers a lump sum in year 1 to
cover future medical expenses, the medical
expenses might exceed plaintiff's income
for the years in which they are paid. Thus,
even if the expenses are otherwise deductible (as a result of the amendment suggested
above), the deduction would be of no use to
plaintiff. A similar problem could arise if
plaintiff pays the expenses in year 1 (presumably with borrowed money) and recovers the award in year 2. This problem does
not arise, of course, if the recovery is excluded from gross income. (In some situations, taxpayers have been able to exclude
the reimbursement from gross income and
deduct the expenses (see Niles v. U.S., 710
F.2d 1391).) If the recovery were taxed, adding a carryover-carryback feature to Sec.
213 would eliminate the potential problem.
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Justification as a Tax Subsidy

The preceding discussion demonstrates
why the exclusion of personal injury damage awards from gross income cannot be
justified as a logical application of tax theory. To the extent that such a justification is
lacking, the exclusion should be evaluated
as a tax subsidy. That is, a Congressional
decision to forego revenues that otherwise
would be due. Although Congress apparently did not originally intend the exclusion to be a subsidy, it functions as such in
the context of modem tax law.
A tax subsidy is an indirect but very real
expenditure of public funds, Congress (at
least in theory) having determined that
such an appropriation serves the public interest. Typically, tax subsidies are provided
to encourage particular activities that are
deemed to be "desirable." For example, by
allowing accelerated depreciation deductions, Congress has provided an incentive
for manufacturers to invest in buildings
and equipment, which in tum stimulates
the general economy. Other tax subsidies
represent government assistance through
reduced tax liability to taxpayers finding
themselves in unfortunate circumstances.
Section 165(c)(3), for example, allows taxpayers to deduct certain casualty losses
that would otherwise be nondeductible personal losses.
The exclusion provided by Sec. 104(a)(2)
compensates tort victims by allowing receipts that logically should be included in
gross income to escape taxation. While an
expenditure of government funds for the
benefit of innocent tort victims has emotional appeal, a closer inspection of the
ramifications of the subsidy reveals that it
is not a wise investment of public resources. As explained below, the subsidy is
not fairly allocated. More importantly,
government subsidization of injuries is
contrary to sound tort policy.
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Allocation of the Subsidy
Assuming, for the moment, that it is desirable for the government to subsidize tort
feasors, tort victims, or both, it should go
without saying that such a subsidy should be
administered fairly and allocated consistently among those who qualify for its benefits. However, several recent developments
indicate that the subsidy is not administered
fairly and consistently. Rather, it is allocated
in a haphazard fashion that surely would not
be tolerated in the context of a direct government expenditure.
Roemer and Threlkeld: Definition of Persona/Injury.- In order to be excluded under Sec. 104(a)(2), damages must be
awarded on account of a "personal injury."
As is often the case, it has been up to the
courts to defme the parameters of the term.
The necessity of judicial interpretation is
not unusual, nor is it an appropriate reason
for criticizing a statute. However, two recent
cases illustrate the possibility of inconsistent interpretations arising out of otherwise meaningless differences in state law.
In Roemer v. Comm'r (716 F.2d 693), the
Ninth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court (79
TC 398), held that Sec. 104(a)(2) excludes
from gross income damages awarded in a
defamation suit, even though the award represented compensation for injury to the
plaintiff's professional reputation. The taxpayer was defamed by an inaccurate credit
report issued in connection with his application for an agency license from an insurance
company. The Tax Court had held that the
award was taxable because it represented
compensation for injury to the taxpayer's
professional reputation rather than his personal reputation. In reaching its decision,
the appeals court set out an impressive exposition on the history of California's defamation law. On the basis of this historical
background, the court concluded that defamation is a personal injury in California.
Therefore, damages awarded in such an ac-

tion are excluded from gross income for
purposes of federal income tax.
While the result in Roemer may be correct, the court's reliance on state law is troubling. Unfair results are inevitable if, as the
Roemer court held, federal tax consequences tum on state Jaw labels. A plaintiff
in state X whose case is factually identical
to Mr. Roemer 's and who recovers the same
amount of damages might be denied the
benefit of Sec. 104(a)(2) simply because
state X does not label the plaintiff's injury
as "personal."
The Tax Court appeared to follow
Roemer in James E. Threlkeld (87 TC
1294). To its credit, the Tax Court emphasized that the label applied by state law is
not determinative of whether a cause of action is based on a personal injury. Nevertheless, the court analyzed local law and in fact
reached its conclusion based on its review
of state law (Tennessee).
In light of Threlkeld, the Ninth Circuit's
Roemer opinion cannot be dismissed as an
isolated example of mistaken analysis.
Whether the potential for inconsistent results inheres in the statute or results from
mistaken interpretation, the problem does
exist. Nor is the problem limited to the
courts, as the following discussion demonstrates.
Revenue Ruling 84-108: Punitive Damages.- According to the IRS's position, the
exclusion of Sec. 104(a)(2) does not extend
to punitive damages (Rev. Rul. 84-108,
1984-2 CB 32). While commentators generally agree that the IRS's position is, in theory, a correct interpretation of the law, the
difficulty of distinguishing punitive from
compensatory damages can lead to unusual
results. Revenue Rul. 84-108, the vehicle
for the announcement of the IRS 's position,
illustrates the potential for inconsistent results arising out of state law differences.
The ruling concerns payments received by
the personal representatives of corporate
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employees who were killed in accidents involving corporate aircraft. In order to receive the payments, which were funded by
an insurance company by arrangement with
the employer, the personal representatives
were required to release any potential
wrongful death claims against the employer.
The ruling addresses identical facts arising
in two different states and concludes that a
payment in lieu of damages recoverable under Virginia law is excludable, while a payment in lieu of damages recoverable under
Alabama law is not excludable. The IRS
based the distinction on the fact that damages under the Alabama wrongful death act
are determined solely on the basis of the degree of fault on the part of the defendant and
thus are "punitive" in nature. Virginia law,
on the other hand, provides for damages to
be determined according to the actual loss
suffered by the decedent's survivors. Thus,
damages received under Virginia law are
not punitive and therefore are excluded
from taxation by Sec. 104(a)(2).
While Rev. Rul. 84-108 dramatically illustrates the potential for unfair results under Sec. 104(a)(2), its analysis rests on
firmer ground than that of Roemer and
Threlkeld. In Roemer and Threlkeld, the
courts applied state law to defme "personal
injury" -the words of a federal statute. In
Rev. Rul. 84-108, the term "personal injury" was not in question. Starting from the
admittedly supportable assumption that Sec.
104(a)(2) excludes damages intended to
compensate the plaintiff but not damages intended to punish the defendant, the ruling
looks to state law simply to determine the
nature of the damages. The analysis is rigid,
but unlike the analyses in Roemer and
Threlkeld, it cannot be called incorrect.
Thus, even if Roemer and Threlkeld can be
dismissed as erroneous, Rev. Rul. 84-108
leads to the conclusion that a correctly interpreted Sec. 104(a)(2) sometimes yields unfair results.
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Evidence and Jury Instructions.- Instructing the jury as to the tax treatment of a
damage award presumably would have an
effect on the amount of the award. For example, if the jury awards the plaintiff $1
million, believing that the plaintiff will have
to pay tax on the award, it could be assumed
that the jury would award something less
than $1 million if instructed that the award
is tax free (see Domeracki v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co ., 443 F.2d 1245). If at least part
of the award constitutes a replacement for
lost earnings, the size of the award would
also be affected if the defendant is permitted
to introduce evidence of the tax the plaintiff
would have paid on those earnings. In other
words, the defendant would want the award
to be based on the plaintiff's "take home
pay," while the plaintiff would prefer an
award based on his "gross pay."
In lawsuits arising under state substantive
law, state law determines whether a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence on
taxes and have the jury instructed that an
award is non-taxable. Not surprisingly, the
results are inconsistent from state to state,
but courts in most states do not allow instructions to juries concerning the tax treatment of potential awards. The rationale behind the rule is that a jury instructed to fmd
the actual amount of a plaintiff's damages
would not normally be expected to go beyond the given instructions and increase its
award to cover the plaintiff's perceived tax
liability (Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
Liepelt, 444 U.S. I490). Moreover, a jury
may fmd that predicting future tax consequences is too complicated. The minority of
state courts that have allowed evidence and
instructions on taxability offer the converse
rationale, for example, absent such evidence
and instructions the jury might erroneously
calculate the amount of the award, and, believing the award to be taxable, inflate the
amount of the verdict to cover that presumed liability. It causes no harm, the courts
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reason, to dispel any possible misconceptions about the taxability of the award (see
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Boxberger, 529
F.2d 284).
In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt (cited above), the Supreme Court held
that an Illinois trial court erred in refusing to
allow evidence of tax liability on lost wages
and a jury instruction on the non-taxability
of a potential award under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The Court observed
that absent such evidence and instructions,
jurors would be likely to arrive at an erroneous damage award and further inflate the
amount of the award to take into account the
presumed tax liability. Two dissenting justices argued that allowing such evidence
amounted to appropriation for the defendant
a subsidy intended for the plaintiff, and that
the jury instruction would unnecessarily
confuse the jury.
Since the Liepelt decision involved a federal cause of action, it is not binding for
lawsuits based on state Jaw. The extent to
which state courts will follow the Court's
lead remains to be seen, but it is unlikely
that a uniform approach will evolve. As
long as different states employ different
rules, the potential exists for widely varying
results. In the Liepelt case, for example, the
original award was $775,000, while the correct amount, under the Court's analysis, apparently would have been $138,000. As discussed below, the result is unsatisfactory under both Liepelt and the majority of state
courts' approach. Even if it is assumed that
one approach or the other can be deemed
"correct," and that Sec. 104(a)(2) serves a
worthwhile purpose, the potential for such
wild variation in verdicts solely because of
local rules of evidence and procedure suggests that Sec. 104(a)(2) does not serve its
purpose effectively.
Niles v. U.S.: The Double Subsidy.- As
explained above, medical expenses are deductible except to the extent the taxpayer is

reimbursed for those expenses (Sec.
213(a)). If the award or settlement allocates
a specific amount to past or future medical
expenses, the amount allocated to past medical expenses is included in the plaintiff's
gross income to the extent the plaintiff deducted the expenses when they were originally paid (Reg. Sec. 1.213-1(g)(l)). Future
medical expenses will be deductible only to
the extent such expenses exceed the amount
allocated to them in the award (Rev. Rul.
75-232, 1975-1 CB 94).
Problems arise when the award or settlement is a lump sum with no allocation
among the various components. The IRS's
position is that a portion of the settlement
must be allocated to medical expenses on
the basis of all the facts and circumstances
(Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 CB 120). Once
the appropriate amount has been determined, the tax consequences are the same as
outlined above. The Ninth Circuit rejected
the IRS's position in Niles v. U.S. (710 F.2d
1391). In Niles, the taxpayer had recovered
a $25,000 verdict against the City of San
Rafael, California, as a result of an injury
sustained on the school playground, and a
$4,000,000 verdict against the hospital that
was allegedly negligent in treating the injury. The jury did not allocate its verdict
among the various components, but on appeal the taxpayer presented an itemization
of the award in response to the defendants'
claim that the award was excessive.
That hypothetical itemization allocated
$1 ,588,176 to future medical expenses and
attendant care. In a later year, when the taxpayer claimed a deduction for those expenses, the IRS denied the deduction because the expenses had been compensated
for by the award. The district court (520 F.
Supp. 808) held that the medical expenses
were fully deductible, and the court of appeals affmned, stating "[m]edical expenses
of a taxpayer are not 'compensated for'
within the meaning of . .. [Sec.] 213(a)

Personal Injury Awards

by any portion of a previous lump-sum personal injury award."
The Niles holding results in a double subsidy for the taxpayer. The award is excluded
from gross income, and the expenses the
award compensates for are deductible. Setting aside the question of whether a subsidy
for medical expenses is appropriate, subsidizing them is a waste of public funds.
Nevertheless, such a result is inevitable unless the IRS's position is followed. The
problem with the IRS's position, as pointed
out by the Niles court, is that it requires
speculation as to what portion of an award
represents compensation for medical expenses. The Ninth Circuit's rule, on the other hand, creates the potential for radically
different results for similarly situated taxpayers solely on the basis of whether the
jury itemizes its verdict. The problem could
be solved by taxing the award and allowing
a deduction for the medical expenses, even
though "compensated for," provided the
compensation is included in gross income.

Tort Policy
The primary function of the tort system is
cost allocation. In appropriate circumstances, the cost of an injury is shifted from
the injured party to the party causing the injury. Presumably, the party causing the injury passes the cost on to its customers, employees, and other constituents. This allocation of cost has the secondary effect of regulating conduct. In theory, if the accident
costs associated with an activity exceed the
benefits derived from the activity, people
will find a safer way of engaging in the activity or abandon it altogether. This line of
analysis is suggested by the definition of
negligence in U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co.
(159 F. 2d 169), which suggests that conduct
is negligent if the cost of a potential injury,
multiplied by the likelihood of that injury
occuring, exceeds the burden of taking precautions adequate to prevent the injury.
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Regardless of whether one subscribes to
the interpretation of this standard as a law of
economics, it must be conceded that the tort
system discourages reckless conduct and
encourages the safest manner, within reason, of carrying out worthwhile activities.
The following discussion explores the impact of Sec. 104(a)(2) on the cost allocation
and regulatory functions of the tort system.
As outlined above, a personal injury damage award represents an accession to wealth
not inherently different from any other and
therefore logically should be included in
gross income. Accordingly, taxation of the
award will be treated as the "correct" result
and used as a basis for evaluating various
alternative results that are possible under the
present rule of excluding the award from
gross income.
Let us assume that a plaintiff has been injured as a result of a defendant's negligent
conduct. The plaintiff's lost wages, lost
earning capacity, and pain and suffering
have a total value of $100,000 (the plaintiff's medical expenses will be disregarded
on the assumption that a deduction under
Sec. 213 would offset any inclusion in gross
income). If the jury awards the plaintiff
$100,000, plaintiff's wealth has been increased by $100,000 and defendant has been
assessed with the cost of the injury he caused. Since the plaintiff has been enriched, he
should pay tax the same as if he had earned
the money. For simplicity, a 28% rate will
be assumed. Thus, the plaintiff will owe
$28,000 in tax, leaving plaintiff with
$72,000, the proper "after tax" recovery.

Situation #1 - The Typical Result under
Current Law
On the facts outlined above, the result under current law is that the plaintiff gets to
keep the entire $100,000 instead of paying
$28,000 in tax. The cost to defendant,
$100,000, is the same. Plaintiff is receiving
an extra $28,000, which ultimately comes,

18
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of course, from the federal government.
This is objectionable for a number of reasons. First, allowing the federal government
to contribute toward the cost of injuries is
contrary to the basic premise of tort law:
that the party negligently causing the injury
should bear its cost. If the public desires a
government-funded accident insurance program, Congress should address the idea directly. A subsidy to the plaintiff also creates
economic distortions. First, the plaintiff is
being told that $10 of compensation for lost
wages is worth $14 of income earned on the
job. This is economically unsound. In addition, if an injury with a true after tax economic value of $72,000 will net an after tax
return of $100,000, the $28,000 premium
adds an incentive to pursue questionable
claims. Finally, if an injury will yield compensation in excess of the actual loss, there
is, at least in theory, an economic incentive
to become an accident victim.

Situation #2- The Jury Inflates the Award
to Cover Imaginary Taxes
Let us assume the same facts outlined
above except that the jury, erroneously believing that the award will be taxed, increases the award to $139,000 to allow for
the taxes. Now, the plaintiff, who should
end up with $72,000 after taxes, walks away
with $139,000 tax free. Of the extra
$67,000, the defendant pays $39,000 and
the federal government pays $28,000. The
message to the plaintiff is the same as in
Situation #1, only louder. The plaintiff now
learns that $10 of compensation for lost
wages is worth $19 of wages earned on the
job, or, put another way, sitting at home injured for one month pays the same as working for two months. The incentive to pursue
questionable claims and the premium on becoming an accident victim are correspondingly increased.
On the other side of the equation, the defendant is now being charged $139,000 for a

$100,000 injury. Although the extra $39,000
was not intended to be a punitive damage
award, it functions as one. If this scenario is
repeated often enough, the defendant will be
driven out of business without economic
justification.

Situation #3- The Jury Reduces the Award
Because It Is Tax Free
Once again, let us assume that defendant
has negligently caused a $100,000 injury to
plaintiff. This time, however, assume that
the jury knows its award is tax free and
therefore reduces the award to $72,000 on
the theory that the plaintiff is receiving an
indirect subsidy of $28,000 from the federal
government. Under this scenario, plaintiff
walks away with the correct amount $72,000. The defendant, however, has caused a $100,000 injury and is paying only
$72,000. Quite simply, the jury has taken
the $28,000 government subsidy away from
the plaintiff and given it to the defendant,
converting the Sec. 104(a)(2) exclusion into
a pure, government-funded insurance program. This conversion frustrates the regulatory function of the tort system. When the
cost of an accident to the defendant is reduced through a government subsidy, the
economic incentive to avoid an accident is
reduced. In legal terms, the standard of care
is lowered.

Situation #4- The Award Is Taxed But the
Jury Erroneously Assumes It Is Tax Free
Finally, one should consider what happens if the award is taxed, but the jury erroneously assumes that it is tax free and therefore reduces the amount of the award. As
outlined above, the "correct" result is
achieved if the award is taxed and the jury
ignores tax considerations in arriving at the
amount. Under that scenario, the defendant
pays the full cost of the injury and the plaintiff gets to keep his or her "fair share." If,
however, the award is taxed and the jury
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reduces the amount believing it is tax free,
the situation is as egregious as any of the
other possibilities discussed above. Using
the same dollar amounts, if the jury found
that the defendant caused $100,000 worth of
damages, but reduced the award to $72,000
thinking it was tax free, the defendant would
pay less than the "correct" amount. As stated above, reducing the cost of the accident
to the defendant reduces the standard of
care. At the same time, the plaintiff is not
adequately compensated. Instead of the correct recovery of $72,000, the plaintiff is left
with only $51,840 after tax. Besides the unfairness of undercompensation on an individual basis, repeated undercompensation of
plaintiffs would reduce the incentive to sue
and thus frustrate the regulatory function of
the tort system.
The preceding examples illustrate that regardless of how the jury deals with the tax
character of a non-taxable award, economic
distortions and frustrations of tort policy are
inevitable. The inescapable conclusion is
that an exclusion of damage awards from
the gross income is fundamentally unsound
from a tort policy standpoint. (At least one
commentator has suggested that repeal of
Sec. 104(a)(2) would no doubt lead to larger
verdicts and higher insurance premiums.)
Even if awards were taxed, distortions
could still result if the jury were not properly instructed. In the case of a taxable award,
the logically correct instruction would be
none at all, since tax considerations should
be ignored. This assumes, however, that the
jury will not engage in misguided speculation as to tax consequences. The potential
consequences of such speculation, as illustrated above, warrant a cautionary instruction to the jury that they should not consider
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the effect of income taxes in arriving at the
amount of the award.
Conclusion

The exclusion of personal injury damage
awards from gross income is inconsistent
with established principles of taxation. Damage awards cannot accurately be characterized as a return of capital. Nor does the
involuntary nature of the transaction justify
the exclusion. While so-called imputed income is not taxed, the reasons supporting its
non-taxability do not extend to damage
awards representing a cash substitute for such
income. Excluding damage awards avoids
certain administrative problems that may otherwise arise, but those problems could be resolved by less drastic means.
Absent a logical explanation based on tax
theory, the exclusion of damage awards must
be viewed as a tax subsidy - a decision
(conscious or otherwise) to forego revenue
that otherwise would be due. Because of definitional, evidentiary, and choice of law problems, the subsidy afforded by Sec. 104(a)(2)
is unfairly administered. More importantly,
government subsidization of accident costs is
inconsistent with tort policy objectives.
There appear to be few, if any, valid reasons for the existence of Sec. 104(a)(2). The
reasons for its repeal appear numerous and
persuasive. If damage awards were taxed, the
policy goals of the tort system would be advanced rather than frustrated, since defendants would not be under-penalized and
plaintiffs would not be overcompensated. In
order to assure this result, however, juries
should be cautioned to ignore tax consequences in determining the amount of
awards.

[Editor's Note: In regard to an area of the tax code related to the "personal
injury award exclusion," it should be noted that the Technical and Miscella-
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neous Revenue Act of 1988 provides that a personal injury liability assignment is treated as a qualified assignment notwithstanding the fact that the
recipient is provided creditor's rights against the assignee greater than those
of a general creditor. No amount is currently includable in the recipient's
income solely because the recipient is provided creditor's rights greater than
those of a general creditor. (See TAMRA Sec. 6079, striking Code Sec.
130(c)(2)(C) and amending Code Sec. 130(c).)]

